HOUSING DYNAMICS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE by Kydland, FE et al.
Housing Dynamics over the Business Cycle*
Finn E. Kydland, Peter Rupert, and Roman Sˇustek1
University of California–Santa Barbara and NBER, U.S.A.; University of California–Santa
Barbara, U.S.A.; Queen Mary, University of London and Centre for Macroeconomics; U.K.
Abstract
Housing construction, measured by housing starts, leads GDP in a number of countries.
Measured as residential investment, the lead is observed only in the U.S. and Canada; else-
where, residential investment is coincident. Variants of existing theory, however, predict
housing construction lagging GDP. In all countries in the sample, nominal interest rates
are low ahead of GDP peaks. Introducing long-term nominal mortgages, and an estimated
process for nominal interest rates, into a standard model aligns the theory with observations
on starts, as mortgages transmit nominal rates into real housing costs. Longer time to build
makes residential investment cyclically coincident.
Shortened title (Running head): Housing Dynamics
JEL Classification Codes: E22, E32, R21, R31.
Keywords: Residential investment, housing starts, business cycle, long-term nominal
mortgages, nominal interest rates, mortgage costs, time to build.
*Manuscript received September 2014; revised June 2015.
1We thank Tom Cooley, Carlos Garriga, Paul Gomme, Grant Hillier, Haroon Mumtaz, Peter Phillips,
Don Schlagenhauf, and Norman Schu¨rhoff for invaluable comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to
Martin Gervais, Erik Hembre, and Vincent Sterk for insightful conference discussions. We are also grateful
for comments and suggestions to two anonymous referees and the Editor, as well as to seminar participants
at Birkbeck, Cal Poly, Cardiff, Cleveland Fed, Concordia, Czech National Bank, Dallas Fed, Edinburgh,
Essex, Exeter, Glasgow, Norges Bank, NYU Stern, Sogang, USC, and Yonsei, and to conference participants
at the Bank of England, Nottingham, Regensburg, Sciences Po, SED (Cyprus), HULM (St. Louis Fed), and
Shanghai. Please address correspondence to: Peter Rupert, Department of Economics, 2127 North Hall,
Santa Barbara, CA 93106. Phone: (805) 893-2258. Fax: (805) 893-8830. E-mail: rupert@econ.ucsb.edu.
1 Introduction
Over the U.S. business cycle, fluctuations in residential investment (newly constructed homes)
are well known to systematically precede fluctuations in real GDP; see, e.g., Leamer (2007).
Perhaps due to this leading indicator property, new housing construction attracts consider-
able attention by professional economists. It has been also repeatedly documented that this
observation is at odds with the properties of business cycle models once the aggregate cap-
ital stock is disaggregated into two basic components: residential and nonresidential (e.g.,
Gomme, Kydland and Rupert, 2001; Davis and Heathcote, 2005). The theory predicts that
nonresidential investment should lead output while residential investment should lag output.
While the cyclical properties of residential (and nonresidential) investment have been
well established for the U.S., little is known about the properties of these data in other
countries. Is the U.S. experience unique and data from other countries support the existing
theory? Or do the data from other countries make the need for improving the theory even
more pressing? This paper has two goals. First, to shed light on the cyclical dynamics of
the two types of investment beyond the U.S. and, second, to use these observations to guide
the development of the theory.
In a sample of developed economies, only Canada is found to exhibit the lead in residential
investment observed in the U.S. Nonetheless, international data do not support existing
models either. In other countries, residential investment is, more or less, coincident with
GDP; not lagging as the theory predicts. And in all countries nonresidential investment is
either lagging or coincident with GDP; not leading as in existing models. The case against the
theory is even stronger when international data on housing starts—the number of housing
units whose construction commenced in a given period—are taken into account: nearly
all countries in the sample exhibit housing starts strongly leading GDP. In other words,
residential construction picks up a few quarters before GDP.
Data on housing completions point to longer residential time to build in some countries
than in the U.S. During the time to build period, national accounts record in each quarter a
construction project’s ‘value put in place’ as a part of residential investment. Time to build
thus spreads recorded residential investment over a number of quarters, making it less of a
leading indicator in countries where time to build is longer.
An important aspect of housing markets in developed economies is reliance of home-
owners on mortgage finance to purchase a property. Mortgage finance takes the form of
nominally denominated loans that homeowners gradually repay, with interest, over many
years.2 Furthermore, the cyclical dynamics of nominal mortgage rates—and nominal in-
terest rates, both long and short, more generally—are strikingly similar across countries.
Specifically, mortgage rates are negatively correlated with future GDP and positively corre-
lated with past GDP, suggesting that mortgage finance is relatively cheap ahead of a peak
in GDP.3
Motivated by these observations, we investigate (i) if the dynamics of nominal interest
rates observed in the data transmit into similar cyclical variations in the real cost of new
mortgage finance and if such variations are sufficient to overturn the standard predictions
of the theory; and (ii) if time to build in residential investment can then account for the
discrepancies between the timing, in relation to output, of housing starts and residential
investment. Various idiosyncracies of individual countries are abstracted from. To this end,
long-term fully-amortizing mortgages and residential time to build are introduced into a
business cycle model of Gomme et al. (2001). Two main types of mortgages are considered:
fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM).4 The exogenous input
into the model is an estimated VAR process for total factor productivity, the nominal mort-
2In contrast, nonresidential fixed investment in advanced economies is predominantly financed by retained
earnings and other forms of equity. Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that typically only about 20 percent
of the value of long-term assets in the nonfinancial corporate sector is financed through debt.
3In all countries in the sample, nominal mortgage rates have similar dynamics as yields on nomi-
nal government bonds of comparable maturities. The ‘inverted’ lead-lag property of U.S. government
bond yields in relation to output has been noted by, for instance, King and Watson (1996) and, more
recently, Backus, Routledge and Zin (2010). The same pattern is documented for other countries by
Henriksen, Kydland and Sˇustek (2013). Unfortunately, a theory that would successfully account for this
phenomenon is yet to be developed.
4Most countries can be broadly classified as having either FRM or ARM as their typical mortgage contract.
Research is still inconclusive on the causes of the cross-country heterogeneity in the use of FRM v.s. ARM,
but likely reasons seem to be government regulations, historical path dependence, and whether mortgage
lenders raise funds through capital markets or bank deposits (e.g., Miles, 2004; Campbell, 2012).
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gage interest rate, and the inflation rate. In the absence of an off-the-shelf structural model
for the observed lead-lag dynamics of nominal interest rates described above, this guarantees
that the cyclical pattern of the nominal mortgage rate (and inflation) in the model is as in
the data.
In a baseline case with one-period residential time to build, and multi-period nonresi-
dential time to build, the model exhibits lead-lag patterns of residential and nonresidential
investment similar to those in the U.S. and Canada, while also being in line with standard
business cycle moments as much as other models in the literature. Introducing into the
model a multi-period time to build in residential construction facilitates the distinction be-
tween housing starts, completions, and residential investment. While mortgage finance is
crucial for producing housing starts leading output, longer time to build pushes residential
investment towards being coincident with output. In both versions of the model, mortgage
finance has also an indirect effect on nonresidential investment—as households want to keep
consumption relatively smooth, when movements in residential investment of the magnitude
observed in the data occur ahead of an increase in GDP, nonresidential investment is delayed,
making it lag output. The relative price of newly constructed homes responds to housing
demand and exhibits cyclical volatility and positive comovement with output similar to those
in the data.
A key to understanding the role of mortgages is in the form of an endogenous time-varying
wedge in the Euler equation for residential capital. The wedge, working like a tax/subsidy
on residential investment, or like a housing taste shock (e.g., Liu, Wang and Zha, 2013),
depends on expected future real mortgage payments over the life of the loan, discounted by
the household’s stochastic discount factor. Thus, unlike observed nominal mortgage rates,
the wedge captures the true cost of the mortgage to the household in the model. Due to the
long-term and nominal nature of mortgage loans (both FRM and ARM), the movements of
the wedge are mainly driven by fluctuations in nominal interest rates. As a result, mortgages
are relatively cheap, from households’ perspective, when nominal interest rates are low, which
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occurs ahead of a GDP peak.5
The lead in U.S. residential investment has puzzled macroeconomists for several decades.
Various models were found to be inconsistent with this observation. In the home pro-
duction literature (Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright, 1991; Greenwood and Hercowitz, 1991;
McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright, 1997) the two types of investment have the opposite lead-
lag dynamics to those in the data. Including investment specific shocks (Gomme and Rupert,
2007) or sectoral productivity shocks in a multisector economy with input-output linkages
(Davis and Heathcote, 2005) does not help resolve this issue.6 Gomme et al. (2001) and
Fisher (2007) achieve partial success (through nonresidential time to build and production
complementarities, respectively), resolving the phase shift of residential investment in re-
lation to nonresidential investment. Nevertheless, both models fail to produce residential
investment leading output.
There are three major features that distinguish our model from recent macro models with
housing finance, such as Iacoviello (2005) and those that followed. First, we focus only on
mortgage costs and how they affect new residential construction. Other models, in contrast,
focus on the role of housing in facilitating collateralized borrowing for general consump-
tion purposes. Our model abstracts from that channel. Second, these models usually do
not include nonresidential capital (one of the few exceptions is Iacoviello and Pavan, 2013).
However, as the home production literature demonstrates, the presence of nonresidential
capital has important implications for the cyclical behavior of residential capital. And third,
housing finance in this literature involves one-period nominal loans, whereas we consider
long-term fully-amortizing nominal loans. Even in the presence of the estimated process for
5These findings are consistent with earlier studies of the U.S. housing market (e.g.,
Kearl, Rosen and Swan, 1975; Kearl, 1979), which find that the nominal interest rate has a negative,
statistically significant, coefficient in regression equations for housing investment. We check that the
negative effect of nominal interest rates on residential investment is not purely due to the expectations of
higher future output (income), following low nominal interest rates.
6The reason behind the opposite pattern is that output produced by nonresidential capital has more uses
than output produced by residential capital: the former can be either consumed or invested in both nonres-
idential and residential capital, whereas the latter can only be consumed as housing services. Investment in
nonresidential capital thus allows better intertemporal smoothing of consumption. This provides a strong
incentive to build up nonresidential capital first, in response to shocks that increase market output.
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nominal interest rates and inflation, one-period loans do not generate the lead in residential
investment.
A growing literature studies the recent housing boom and bust, focusing on the con-
sequences of the developments in mortgage markets (e.g., the relaxation of collateralized
borrowing) and international capital markets (the inflow of foreign capital into U.S. govern-
ment securities). Both representative agent (e.g. Garriga, Manuelli and Peralta-Alva, 2014)
and heterogeneous agent (e.g. Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2015) economies
are used. Instead, this paper addresses the typical fluctuations in a number of countries over
the past half-century or so. In terms of modeling housing finance, our model differs from the
above studies along two dimensions. First, mortgages in our model resemble first lien loans
for new house purchases, rather than collateralized borrowing encompassing also second lien
loans and home equity loans that can be used for other purposes as well.7 And second,
mortgages in our model are long-term nominal contracts, whereas the above studies consider
loans denominated in real terms, either one-period loans (Favilukis et al., 2015) or long-term
loans (Garriga et al., 2014). For our result, both the long-term and nominal nature of the
loans matters.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the empirical findings. Section 3
describes the model. Section 4 explains how nominal interest rates affect housing investment.
Section 5 reports the main findings. Section 6 demonstrates the quantitative importance of
mortgages. Section 7 concludes. The paper is accompanied by a supplemental material
containing six appendices. Appendix A provides a description of the international data
used in Section 2. Appendix B contains some additional derivations and examples related
to Sections 3 and 4 and describes the computation. Appendix C contains estimates of the
exogenous stochastic processes used in Sections 5 and 6. Finally, Appendices D, E, and F
conduct further sensitivity analysis (stochastic loan-to-value ratio, alternative amortization
schedules, and refinancing).
7Second lien loans and home equity loans started to play an important role in the U.S. only during the
run up to the financial crisis (2002-2007). Furthermore, in some countries in our sample the use of such
mortgage products is limited (Calza, Monacelli and Stracca, 2013).
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2 Leads and lags in investment data
The empirical analysis is based on quarterly data for the following countries and peri-
ods: Australia (1959.Q3-2006.Q4), Belgium (1980.Q1-2006.Q4), Canada (1961.Q1-2006.Q4),
France (1971.Q1-2006.Q4), the U.K. (1965.Q1-2006.Q4), and the U.S. (1958.Q1-2006.Q4).
These are the only countries for which the breakdown of total investment into residential
and nonresidential is available from at least 1980 (we regard a period of about 25 years as
the shortest that allows a sensible discussion of business cycles). Appendix A provides a
description of the data and lists the availability of the data for other countries.
All investment data are measured as chained-weighted quantity indexes and, subject to
slightly different treatment of software expenditures, are conceptually comparable across
countries (European Cenral Bank, 2005). As in other business cycle studies, the data are
logged and filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the empirical regularities are sum-
marized in the form of correlations with real (chained-weighted) GDP at various leads and
lags; i.e., by corr(xt+j, GDPt) for j = {−4,−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, where xt+j and GDPt
are, respectively, the percentage deviations of the variable of interest and real GDP from a
HP filter trend. A variable is said to be leading the cycle (meaning leading real GDP) if the
highest correlation is at j < 0, as lagging the cycle if the highest correlation is at j > 0, and
as coincident with the cycle if the highest correlation is at j = 0.8
2.1 Total, residential, and nonresidential investment
To set the stage, Figure 1 plots the cross-correlations for total investment, referred to in
national accounts as gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), which accounts on average for
a little over 20 percent of GDP. The figure caption reports the volatility of the investment
data, measured by the standard deviation of investment relative to that of real GDP. As the
8The findings are not particularly sensitive to if, instead, the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass
filter is used. Due to the well-known end-point problems of the filters, the ongoing recessions are not included
in the sample. Nevertheless, observations of turning points during the 2006-2008 period are consistent with
the empirical regularities documented in this section.
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figure shows, in all six countries total investment is coincident with GDP. In addition, the
volatility of total investment is between 2.5 times to 4 times the volatility of GDP, which is
in the ballpark of the much-cited volatility of U.S. investment (about 3 times the volatility of
GDP) and the prediction of a prototypical business cycle model with standard calibration.
Figure 2 displays the cross-correlations for residential and nonresidential structures, which
together with equipment & software make up GFCF (nonresidential structures make up on
average about 25 percent, equipment & software 45 percent, and residential structures 30
percent of GFCF); volatilities of the data are again reported in the figure caption. Resi-
dential structures include new houses, apartment buildings, and other dwellings, whereas
nonresidential structures include new office buildings, retail parks, production plants, power
plants etc. We will often refer to residential structures as ‘residential investment’ and to
nonresidential structures as ‘nonresidential investment’.9 The empirical regularity discussed
in the Introduction that over the U.S. business cycle residential investment leads GDP is
clearly evident. The chart for the U.S. also shows that nonresidential investment has the
opposite dynamics to those of residential investment, lagging GDP over the business cycle.
Such a stark difference in the dynamic properties of residential and nonresidential investment
is to a lesser extent observed also in Canada, but in the remaining countries the two types
of investment tend to be, more or less, coincident with GDP.
In order to get a sense of the significance of the leads and lags (or their absence) in the
charts of Figure 2, the following test is carried out. Using a standard block bootstrap with
nonstochastic overlapping blocks (see, e.g., Hardle, Horowitz and Kreiss, 2003), 10,000 pairs
of artificial data series for investment and GDP, of the same length as the historical data, are
drawn for each country. For each artificial sample, the cross-correlations are computed and
the j ∈ {−4, ..., 0, ..., 4} at which the highest correlation occurs is recorded. Figure 3 plots
the histograms of these occurrences at different j’s.10 As the histograms show, for residential
9In the case of Belgium and France the cross-correlations are for the sum of nonresidential structures
and equipment & software as the two series are not available individually. In the countries for which the
breakdown is available, equipment & software behaves, qualitatively, like nonresidential structures.
10The length of each block in the bootstrap is set equal to 20 quarters in order to address the serial
correlation of around 0.9 in the historical data. While the accuracy of block bootstrap methods can be
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investment, the U.S. and Canada are the only countries for which the highest correlation
is at a lead (i.e., at a j < 0) in at least 95 percent of the draws, while for nonresidential
investment only the U.S. has the highest correlation at a lag (i.e., at a j > 0) in at least
95 percent of the draws. Nevertheless, with the exception of Belgium, for which the test is
inconclusive even at a 90 percent confidence level, all countries exhibit residential investment
either leading or coincident with GDP; i.e., the highest correlation occurs at a j ≤ 0 in more
than 95 percent of the draws. And with the exception of the U.K., for which the test is
inconclusive, all countries exhibit nonresidential investment either lagging or coincident with
GDP; i.e., the highest correlation occurs at a j ≥ 0 in more than 95 percent of the draws.
The standard predictions of the theory are thus not supported by the available international
data.
2.2 Housing starts
While the lead-lag dynamics of residential investment in the U.S. and Canada look different
from those in the other countries, there is much more uniformity across the countries in
terms of the lead-lag dynamics of housing starts.11 The ‘start’ of housing construction is
defined consistently across countries as the beginning of excavation for the foundation of a
residential building (single family or multifamily). Every month detailed surveys of home
builders record the number of such activities. The top half of Figure 4 plots the cross-
correlations with GDP for the historical data (volatilities are in the figure caption); the data
are again logged and HP-filtered. As is visually apparent, housing starts lead GDP in all
countries, possibly with the exception of Belgium. The bottom half of the figure reports the
results of a similar robustness check as in the case of investment. In 95 percent of the draws
the lead occurs in the case of Canada, the U.K., and the U.S and in 90 percent of the draws
sensitive to the choice of the block length (Hardle et al., 2003), the main takeaway form Figure 3 is unaffected
by changing the length by up to +/- six quarters.
11The time periods for housing starts differ slightly from the time periods for residential structures due to
differences in data availability. Housing starts are for the following periods: Australia (1965.Q3-2006.Q4),
Belgium (1968.Q1-2006.Q4), Canada (1960.Q1-2006.Q4), France (1974.Q1-2006.Q4), the U.K. (1978.Q1-
2006.Q4), and the U.S. (1959.Q1-2006.Q4). Details of the data are provided in Appendix A.
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also in the case of Australia and France.
2.3 Residential time to build
While housing starts record the number of housing units whose construction commenced,
residential investment in national accounts records value put in place on residential projects
in a given quarter, as estimated from surveys of home builders (European Commission, 1999;
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009).12 Construction projects that take longer to complete
therefore have value put in place recorded over more quarters. In the U.S., the Survey of
Construction provides details on construction lead times (time to build) for different types
of residential structures. The average period from start to completion for a typical single-
family structure built for sale is 5.5 months; for an owner-built13 single-family structure the
lead time is 10 months; and for multifamily structures the lead time is 10 months for the
aggregate and 13 months for 20+ unit structures. The lead times for the different structure
types are approximately constant over time. In national accounts, single-family units make
up on average about 80 percent of new permanent residential structures and owner-built
units account on average for only 14 percent of single-family units. Residential investment
in the U.S. thus mainly reflects the relatively short lead time of single-family units built for
sale.
In addition to data on housing starts, the U.S. Survey of Construction provides quarterly
data on completions for single and multifamily structures (data for the individual structure
types within single and multifamily structures are available only from 1999 and thus too short
for our purposes). The cross-correlations of starts and completions with GDP are reported
in Table 1. They reflect the lead times noted above: for single family units, starts lead GDP
by three quarters while completions lead by two quarters; for multifamily units, starts lead
GDP by two quarters while completions lag GDP by two quarters (the multifamily data
12Residential investment also includes capital expenses on improvements and brokers’ commissions on
sales.
13Custom-built structures whereby an individual commissions an architect and a builder to build a house
for own use.
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are for 5+ unit structures). The table also reports cross-correlations for single-family and
multifamily residential investment. The highest cross-correlations lie in-between the highest
cross-correlations for starts and completions for the respective structure types: single-family
structures lead GDP by two quarters and multifamily structures are coincident with GDP.
Information on construction lead times in other countries is scarce. However, exploiting
the above properties of the U.S. data, we can use available data on housing completions in
other countries, published alongside the housing starts data, to obtain estimates of construc-
tion lead times. The only countries for which long enough completions data are available
are Australia and the U.K. Table 1 shows that in Australia housing starts lead by two quar-
ters while completions are coincident with GDP and in the U.K. housing starts lead by two
quarters while completions lag GDP by one quarter. These correlations suggest up to three-
quarter time to build in Australia and up to four-quarter time to build in the U.K. As in the
case of the U.S., in both Australia and the U.K. the highest cross-correlation of residential
investment lies in-between the highest cross-correlations of starts and completions.
Why are there differences in residential time to build across developed economies? Ball
(2003) conducts a cross-country comparative study of the structure and practices of home-
building industries. He points out substantial variations across countries in the materials
used, the extent of pre-fabrication, supply chain efficiency, and regulatory constraints. In
addition, the composition of housing investment differs across countries. In Belgium and
France, multifamily structures account for almost 40 percent and owner-built single-family
structures for further 45-50 percent of new construction (Dol and Haffner, 2010). Assuming
that multifamily and owner-built structures in Belgium and France take at least as long
time to build as in the U.S., the lead times for the residential sectors as a whole in the two
countries are likely to be close to four quarters.
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2.4 Regulation Q
Regulation Q is sometimes evoked as a reason for the leading behavior of residential invest-
ment over the U.S. business cycle (e.g., Bernanke, 2007). This regulation set ceilings on
interest rates that savings banks and savings and loans—the main mortgage lenders before
mid-1980s—were allowed to pay on deposits. When interest rates increased, these institu-
tions experienced deposit outflows and had to cut mortgage lending, thus causing decline in
construction activity and possibly a wider recession. Regulation Q was eventually abolished
in 1980 and phased out during the following four years.
In order to assess the effect of Regulation Q, the top panel of Table 2 reports the cross-
correlations of single family residential investment with GDP in two subsamples: 1959.Q1-
1983.Q4 and 1984.Q1-2006.Q4. The focus is on single family structures as the multifamily
market was strongly affected by tax code changes that occurred in the 1980s (Colton and Collignon,
2001). The key observation is that investment in residential structures leads GDP in both
periods, even though, admittedly, the correlations at all leads and lags are weaker in the
second period than in the first period. Thus, while Regulation Q likely played a role in
the cyclical dynamics of residential investment in the first period—possibly accounting for
the stronger correlations—it cannot be the only reason for why movements in residential
investment precede movements in GDP.
2.5 Mortgage rates
An important feature of housing markets in developed economies is that the acquisition of
a residential property relies on debt financing. In the U.S., based on historical data from
the Survey of Construction, on average 94 percent of new single-family house purchases are
financed by a mortgage (76 percent by a 30-year conventional mortgage and 18 percent by
FHA/VA insured mortgages). The remaining 6 percent are cash purchases. Furthermore,
the cross-sectional average of the loan-to-value ratio for newly-built homes conventional
mortgages is 76 percent and this ratio has been remarkably stable over time, fluctuating
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within a range of a couple of percentage points (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly
Interest Rate Survey, Table 10; plotted in Appendix D).14 About 25 percent of new single-
family homes are on average sold at the development stage, 40 percent are sold during the
construction process, and 35 percent are sold after completion (Survey of Construction).
Issuance of home mortgage loans therefore, unsurprisingly, exhibits similar lead-lag pattern
as single-family residential investment, leading GDP by two quarters, as the middle panel
of Table 2 shows.15 In other countries in the sample, mortgage finance plays an important
role as well. The typical loan-to-value ratio varies across-countries from 70 to 90 percent
(Ahearne, Ammer, Doyle, Kole and Martin, 2005; Calza et al., 2013) and mortgage debt
outstanding in 2009 was equivalent to 40-90 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund,
2011); 75 percent in the U.S.
The next section derives the real cost of mortgage finance to a representative household.
Here, Table 3 reports the lead-lag dynamics of two variables that affect that cost, the nom-
inal mortgage interest rate and the inflation rate. According to a number of studies (e.g.,
Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004; Calza et al., 2013), national mortgage markets can be gener-
ally characterized as either FRM dominated or ARM dominated, though the cross-country
heterogeneity of mortgage market structures is yet to be understood (Campbell, 2012). For
each country in the sample, Table 3 reports the standard deviation (relative to real GDP)
and cross-correlations with real GDP of the nominal interest rate on the country’s typical
mortgage. In addition, the table reports these statistics for government nominal bond yields
of maturities comparable to the period for which the mortgage rate in the typical mortgage
contract is fixed.16 The third variable in the table is the inflation rate. For future reference
14The Monthly Interest Rate Survey is based on first lien loans. It thus does not capture the rise in
the use of second lien and home equity loans in the U.S. during the pre-crisis period 2002-2007 (see, e.g.,
Favilukis et al., 2015).
15The mortgage loan data are for the net change in mortgage debt outstanding obtained from the Flow
of Funds Accounts, Table F.217, and deflated with the GDP deflator. Flow of Funds tables report home
mortgages, defined as mortgages for 1-4 family properties. The fraction of new construction accounted for
by 2-4 family properties is, however, negligible (completions data from the Survey of Construction). Home
mortgages are thus a good proxy for single family property mortgages. The findings are similar whether or
not home equity lines of credit, broadly available from mid-1990s, are included.
16Specifically, for FRM countries we take par yields on coupon government bonds of maturities close to the
periods for which FRM mortgage rates are fixed; for ARM countries we take 3-month Treasury bill yields, as
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we also include the yield on U.S. 3-month Treasury bills. The table reveals a striking similar-
ity across countries in the cyclical dynamics of these variables: generally, all three variables
are negatively correlated with future GDP and positively correlated with past GDP. Thus,
on average, nominal interest rates and inflation rates are relatively low before a GDP peak,
tend to increase as GDP increases, and reach their peak a few quarters after a peak in GDP.
This pattern of nominal interest rates and inflation rates has been previously documented
by King and Watson (1996) for the U.S. and by Henriksen et al. (2013) for a number of
developed economies. The table also shows that the cross-correlations of mortgage rates are
similar to those of government bond yields. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the general
shape of the lead-lag pattern of these variables stayed the same across two U.S. monetary
policy regimes—identified, as in Gavin and Kydland (2000), by the appointment of Paul Vol-
cker as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve—even though the correlations became weaker
in the second period.
3 A business cycle model with mortgage loans
Motivated by the above observations, this section introduces mortgages into a business cycle
model with home and market sectors studied by Gomme et al. (2001), mentioned in the
Introduction, henceforth referred to as GKR. It is worth pointing out at the outset that
we do not model the underlying reasons giving rise to the demand for mortgages, such as
the lumpiness of house purchases, the tax code, or the preference for owning v.s. renting.
Modeling demand for mortgages from first principles would make the model unnecessarily
complex for the task at hand, which is to investigate the impact of nominal interest rates
on the real cost of mortgage finance and, consequently, on residential investment. For this
purpose, we simply assume that a fraction of new housing is financed through mortgages
and calibrate this fraction from the data. As noted above, in the data this fraction is
mortgage rates on ARMs are set, after some initial period, as a margin over a short-term government bond
yield.
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approximately constant over time.17
3.1 Preferences and technology
A representative household has preferences over consumption of a market-produced good
cMt, a home-produced good cHt, and leisure, which is given by 1 − hMt − hHt, where hMt
is time spent in market work and hHt is time spent in home work. The preferences are
summarized by the utility function
(1) E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, 1− hMt − hHt) , β ∈ (0, 1),
where u(., .) has all the standard properties and ct is a composite good, given by a constant-
returns-to-scale aggregator c(cMt, cHt). Time spent in home work is combined with home
capital kHt to produce the home good according to a production function
(2) cHt = AHG(kHt, hHt),
where G(., .) has all the standard properties. In contrast to the home production litera-
ture, we abstract from durable goods and equate home capital with residential structures
when mapping the model to data. Home capital will therefore be referred to as ‘residential
capital’.18
Output of the market-produced good yt is determined by an aggregate production func-
17Gervais (2002), Rios-Rull and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), and Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009)
develop models with many of the micro-level details we abstract from. Their focus, however, is on steady-
state analysis. Campbell and Cocco (2003) model in detail a single household’s mortgage choice in partial
equilibrium, while Koijen, Van Hemert and Van Nieuwerburgh (2009) embed a two-period version of such
a problem in general equilibrium with aggregate shocks. Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) construct a general
equilibrium model with some of the features in Gervais (2002) and aggregate shocks. Housing finance in
their model, however, takes the form of one-period loans.
18cHt is thus consumption of housing services and hHt is interpreted as time devoted to home maintenance
and leisure enjoyed at home, as opposed to in a bar. Under enough separability in utility and production
functions, which will be imposed under calibration, the period utility function can be rewritten such that it
is a function of cMt, hMt, and kHt (Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright, 1995). This makes it comparable to
models that put housing directly in the utility function.
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tion
(3) yt = AMtF (kMt, hMt),
operated by identical perfectly competitive firms. Here, AMt is total factor productivity
(TFP) and kMt is market capital, which will be referred to as ‘nonresidential capital’.
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Firms rent labor and capital services from households at a wage rate wt and a capital rental
rate rt, respectively. The market-produced good can be used for consumption, investment
in residential capital, xHt, and investment in nonresidential capital, xMt.
The production possibilities frontier (PPF) is assumed to be concave in ct + xKt and
xHt. Specifically, ct + xMt + qtxHt = yt, where qt = exp(σ(xtH − xH)), with σ > 0 and
xH being steady-state residential investment. Here, qt measures the rate of transformation
between new housing and other uses of output and is increasing and convex in the amount
of new housing. qt is thus the relative price of residential investment. The concavity of
the PPF is a stand-in for the costs of changing the composition of an economy’s production
(Huffman and Wynne, 1999); a concave PPF results also in Davis and Heathcote (2005) due
to different factor shares in the economy’s production sectors. When the PPF is linear, the
two types of investment are too sensitive to the shocks in the model.20
We start with one-period residential time to build. Residential capital therefore evolves
as
(4) kH,t+1 = (1− δH)kHt + xHt,
19Notice that, in contrast to AMt, which is time varying (due to shocks), AH is constant. GKR show
that under enough separability in utility and production functions, which will be imposed under calibration,
shocks to AH do not affect market variables (i.e., time spent in market work, consumption of the market-
produced good, and accumulation of the two types of capital). This is convenient as it allows abstracting
from home-production TFP shocks, which cannot be measured outside of the model.
20An additional source of adjustment costs on residential investment considered by Davis and Heathcote
(2005) is a constant endowment of new residential land each period, which is combined in a Cobb-Douglas
production function with residential investment to produce new housing. Our model abstracts from residen-
tial land. Residential investment and new housing are thus the same thing.
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where δH ∈ (0, 1). As in GKR, nonresidential capital has a J-period time to build, where J
is an integer greater than one. Specifically, an investment project started in period t becomes
a part of the capital stock only in period t + J . However, the project requires value to be
put in place throughout the construction process from period t to t+ J − 1. In particular, a
fraction φj ∈ [0, 1] of the project must be invested in period t+ J − j, j ∈ {1, ..., J}, where
j denotes the number of periods from completion and
∑J
j=1 φj = 1. Let sjt be the size of
the projects that in period t are j periods from completion. Total nonresidential investment
(i.e., investment across all on-going projects) in period t is thus
(5) xMt =
J∑
j=1
φjsjt
and the projects evolve recursively as
(6) sj−1,t+1 = sjt, j = 2, . . . , J,
(7) kM,t+1 = (1− δM)kMt + s1t,
where δM ∈ (0, 1).
3.2 Mortgage loans
Up until now, with the exception of the concave PPF, the setup is the same as in GKR.
What makes the current model different is that residential investment is partially financed
by mortgages
(8) lt = θptqtxHt,
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where lt is the nominal value of a mortgage loan taken out in period t, θ ∈ [0, 1) is a loan-
to-value ratio, and pt is the aggregate price level (the price of the market good in ‘dollars’).
Notice that the constraint (8) is different from that in Iacoviello (2005) and related
models. Here, the loan taken out in period t is only used to finance new homes constructed
in period t, whereas in Iacoviello (2005), a loan taken out in period t is collateralized by the
period-t+1 value of the housing stock and can be used for other purposes than acquisition of
new housing. In this sense, our loan resembles a first mortgage, whereas that of Iacoviello is
closer to a home equity loan as it allows continuous borrowing, for general purposes, against
the value of the housing stock.21
Mortgage debt is paid off by regular nominal installments. The representative household’s
budget constraint is therefore
(9) cMt + xMt + qtxHt = (1− τr)rtkMt + (1− τw)wthMt + δMτrkMt + lt
pt
− mt
pt
+ τt,
where τr is a tax rate on income from nonresidential capital, τw is a tax rate on labor income,
τt is a lump-sum transfer, and mt are nominal installments on outstanding mortgage debt.
22
The installments are given as
(10) mt = (Rt + δDt)dt,
where dt is the nominal mortgage debt outstanding, Rt is an effective net interest rate on
21Strictly speaking, the constraint (8) is lt ≤ θptqtxHt, but it is assumed to be binding in all states of
the world. If it is slack, the choice of xHt is independent of the choice of lt and housing finance does not
affect equilibrium allocations—the wedge in the Euler equation for housing derived below becomes zero and
the properties of the model become the same as in GKR. An empirical justification for our assumption,
noted in the previous section, is that the cross-sectional mean of the loan-to-value ratio for conventional
single-family newly-built home mortgages has been historically approximately constant (about 0.76, with
a standard deviation of one percentage point), despite large changes in nominal interest rates and other
economic conditions; Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate Survey, Table 10, 1963-2007;
see the figures in Appendix D. Note that the Survey is based on first-lien loans. It thus does not capture the
rise in the use of second lien and home equity loans in the U.S. during the pre-crisis period 2002-2007 (see,
e.g., Favilukis et al., 2015).
22τr and τw are constant and, as in the rest of the home production literature, are introduced into the
model purely for calibration purposes; τt is time-varying and its role is to ensure that the economy’s resource
constraint holds.
17
the outstanding mortgage debt, and δDt ∈ (0, 1) is an effective amortization rate of the
outstanding mortgage debt. Notice that δDt ∈ (0, 1) implies that mt > Rtdt; i.e., a part of
the outstanding debt is amortized each period. Mortgages are only either FRM or ARM.
The variables dt, Rt, and δDt are state variables evolving recursively according to the laws
of motion
(11) dt+1 = (1− δDt)dt + lt,
(12) δD,t+1 = (1− νt)f(δDt) + νtκ,
(13) Rt+1 =
 (1− νt)Rt + νtit, if FRM,it, if ARM.
Here, νt ≡ lt/dt+1 is the share of new loans in the new stock of debt and (1 − νt) ≡
(1− δDt)dt/dt+1 is the share of the outstanding unamortized debt in the new stock of debt.
In addition, it is the nominal mortgage interest rate on new loans and κ ∈ (0, 1) is the initial
amortization rate of new loans. Finally, f(δDt), discussed further below, is a smooth function
with the following properties: f(δDt) ∈ (0, 1), f ′(δDt) > 0, f ′′(δDt) > 0 for δDt close to zero,
and f ′′(δDt) < 0 for δDt close to one. Notice that combining equations (10) and (11) gives
the evolution of mortgage debt in a more familiar form: dt+1 = (1 +Rt)dt −mt + lt.
3.2.1 An example and explanation
It is worth pausing here to explain in more detail the laws of motion (11)-(13) and their
implications for the time path of mortgage installments (10). For this purpose, let us suppose
that the representative household has no outstanding debt (d0 = 0) and takes out a FRM
in period t = 0 in the amount l0 > 0. Let us further assume that the household does not
take out any new mortgage loans in subsequent periods (i.e., l1 = l2 = ... = 0). Equations
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(10)-(13) then yield the following path of mortgage installments: In period t = 1, the
household’s outstanding debt is d1 = l0, the initial amortization rate at which this debt will
be reduced going into the next period is δD1 = κ, and the effective interest rate is R1 = i0.
Mortgage payments in t = 1 are thus m1 = (R1 + δD1)d1 = (i0 + κ)l0. In period t = 2 the
outstanding debt is d2 = (1 − κ)l0 and is reduced at a rate δD2 = f(κ) > κ going into the
next period. The interest rate R2 is again equal to i0. Mortgage payments in t = 2 are
thus m2 = (R2 + δD2)d2 = [i0 + f(κ)](1 − κ)l0 and so on. Notice that whereas the interest
part of mortgage payments, Rtdt, declines as debt gets amortized, the amortization part,
δDtdt, increases if δDt grows at a fast enough rate. An appropriate choice of f(.) ensures
that the amortization part increases at such a rate so as to keep mt approximately constant
for a specified period of time (e.g., 30 years), thus approximating the defining characteristic
of a standard FRM. A simple polynomial, which is used in our computational experiments,
f(δDt) = δ
α
Dt, with α = 0.9946 (and κ = 0.00162), is found to work fairly well, but higher-
order polynomials can also be used for further precision (see Appendix B for details). An
ARM works similarly, except that the interest part varies in line with changes in it.
Generally, mortgage payments can be calculated in two equivalent ways: an annuity
formula or specifying an increasing sequence of amortization rates, with the final rate equal
to one (see, for instance, Fabozzi, Modigliani and Jones, 2010). Here, we use the second
method and approximate the finite sequence of amortization rates with an infinite sequence.
With the approximation, even though the mortgage never matures, the payments after 30
years are essentially zero and, through out the 30 years, are approximately constant (see
Appendix B for further details). This modeling choice is convenient in environments with
infinitely-lived households as both the households and their mortgages live forever (even
though the payments on these obligations after 30 years are essentially zero). Alternatively,
it would be necessary in the household’s optimization problem to keep track of the number of
periods remaining on a given mortgage and, at the aggregate level, of the different vintages
of mortgage debt. Our specification based on amortization rates also allows easy comparison
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with the alternatives considered in the literature, discussed below, and a simple exposition
of the effect of nominal interest rates on the model dynamics, discussed in Section 4.2.
3.2.2 The general case
In the computational experiments below, the representative household starts with the econ-
omy’s initial (steady-state) outstanding debt and, in response to shocks, chooses xHt, and
thus lt, every period. In this case, δD,t+1 evolves as the weighted average of the amortization
rate of the outstanding stock, f(δDt), and the initial amortization rate of new loans, κ, with
the weights being the relative sizes of the current unamortized stock and the current flow
in the new stock, respectively. Similarly, in the case of FRM, Rt+1 evolves as the weighted
average of the interest rate paid on the outstanding stock, Rt, and the interest rate charged
for new loans, it. In the case of ARM, the current interest rate applies to both, the new loan
and the outstanding stock.23
3.3 Exogenous process and closing the model
The price level pt evolves as pt = (1+pit)pt−1, where the inflation rate pit follows an estimated
VAR(n) process with the current nominal mortgage rate it and market TFP: zt+1b(L) = εt+1,
where zt = [logAMt, it, pit]
>, εt+1 ∼ N(0,Σ), and b(L) = I− b1L− ...− bnLn (L being the lag
operator). As households in the model have access to only either FRM or ARM, the mortgage
rate in the VAR is either an FRM rate or an ARM rate, depending on the experiment. Note
that, as we are interested in unconditional moments of the data generated by the model, no
identification assumptions on the orthogonality of the shocks in the VAR process are needed.
23Most existing business cycle models with housing assume one-period loans. The interest rate applied to
the loan is either the current short-term interest rate (e.g., Iacoviello, 2005, and many others), a weighted
average of the current and past interest rates (Rubio, 2011), or evolving in a sticky Calvo-style fashion
(Graham and Wright, 2007). The loan in Iacoviello (2005) is equivalent to δDt = 1 for all t, whereas the
loans in Rubio (2011) and Graham and Wright (2007) are equivalent to δDt = 1 for all t in equation (11), but
not in equation (13). Calza et al. (2013) model FRM as a two-period loan and ARM as a one-period loan.
The housing debt of Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) and Garriga et al. (2014) is equivalent to equations
(11)-(13) when the loan is ARM and the amortization rate δDt ∈ (0, 1) is held constant (and the loans are
denominated in real terms).
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The model is closed by including a government, ensuring that the economy’s resource
constraint holds. The government collects revenues from capital and labor income taxes
and operates the mortgage market by collecting mortgage instalments and providing new
mortgage loans. Each period the government balances its budget by lump-sum transfers to
the household, τt = τrrtkMt + τwwthMt − τrδMkMt +mt/pt − lt/pt, which can be negative.
The exogenous VAR process is a reduced form capturing the aspects of financial markets
behind the observed lead-lag dynamics of nominal interest rates, both at the long end (FRM)
and the short end (ARM) of the yield curve. As mentioned above, in the absence of an
off-the-shelf structural model, the VAR process ensures that the lead-lag pattern of the
mortgage rate (and the inflation rate) is as in the data. Koijen et al. (2009) take a similar
approach, appending their model economy with a reduced-form model for interest rates
in order to generate their realistic dynamics. As mortgages are priced exogenously, the
stochastic discount factor of the household in the model is implicitly different from the
pricing kernel reflected in the exogenous process for mortgage rates. If the two were the
same, mortgage finance would not play any role. Inequality between the stochastic discount
factor of the household and the pricing kernel in financial markets (due to, e.g., market
incompleteness, segmentation, or regulation) is a necessary condition for mortgages to affect
housing decisions in any model. This is not to say that otherwise there would be no borrowing
and lending, but rather that the form of the loan contract, short-term v.s. long-term or FRM
v.s. ARM, would be irrelevant.
4 The effect of mortgages on housing investment
This section characterizes the effect of mortgages on housing investment. Due to space con-
straints, equilibrium conditions that are not essential for the current discussion are relegated
to Appendix B (this appendix also describes computation).
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4.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined as follows: (i) the representative household solves its utility
maximization problem, described below, taking all prices and transfers as given; (ii) rt and
wt are equal to their marginal products and qt is the marginal rate of transformation; (iii)
the government budget constraint is satisfied; and (iv) the exogenous variables follow the
VAR(n) process. The aggregate resource constraint, cMt + xMt + qtxHt = yt, then holds
by Walras’ Law. To characterize the equilibrium, it is convenient to work with a recursive
formulation of the household’s problem
V (s1t, ..., sJ−1,t, kMt, kHt, dt, δDt, Rt) = max{u (ct, 1− hMt − hHt)
+βEtV (s1,t+1, ..., sJ−1,t+1, kM,t+1, kH,t+1, dt+1, δD,t+1, Rt+1)},
subject to (2) and (4)-(13). After substituting the constraints into the Bellman equation,
the maximization is only with respect to hMt, hHt, sJt, and xHt. Here, xHt affects the
period utility function u through its effect on the budget constraint and the value function
V through its effect on the laws of motion for kH,t+1, dt+1, δD,t+1, and Rt+1.
There is enough separability in this problem that the variables related to mortgage finance
(dt, δDt, Rt; it, pit) show up only in the first-order condition for xHt. In this section we simply
state the optimality condition. Its interpretation and how it impacts on the results is delayed
until the next section. The optimality condition may appear somewhat cumbersome, but as
the next section shows, its interpretation is fairly straightforward.
The first-order condition for xHt is:
(14)
u1tc1t(1− θ)qt − θqtβEt
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζDt(κ− δαDt)VδD,t+1 + ζDt(it −Rt)VR,t+1
]
= βEtVkH,t+1.
Here, V˜d,t+1 ≡ ptVd,t+1, d˜t ≡ dt/pt−1 and VkH,t, Vdt, VδD,t, and VRt are the derivatives of the
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value function with respect to the state variables specified in the subscript.24 The above re-
definitions of Vd,t+1 and dt are required to ensure that the optimization problem is well-defined
in the presence of nonzero steady-state inflation. Further, ζDt measures the marginal contri-
bution of unamortized debt to the stock of new debt, ζDt ≡
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t
)
/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θqtxHt
)2
,
and the terms ζDt(κ − δαDt)VδD,t+1 and ζDt(it − Rt)VR,t+1 capture the marginal effects of
changes in the effective amortization and interest rates, respectively, on the household’s life-
time utility, occurring due to changes in the stock of unamortized debt. Notice that these
two terms are equal to zero when old debt and new loans carry the same amortization and
interest rates.
It is instructive to rearrange the first-order condition (14) as
(15) u1tc1tqt(1 + τHt) = βEtVkH,t+1,
where VkH,t+1 is decreasing in kH,t+1 (see Appendix B) and
(16) τHt = −θ
{
1 +
βEtV˜d,t+1
u1tc1t
+
ζDt(κ− δαDt)βEtVδD,t+1
u1tc1t
+
ζDt(it −Rt)βEtVR,t+1
u1tc1t
}
is an endogenous time-varying wedge, further discussed below. For τHt = 0, equation (15)
has a straightforward interpretation: it equates this period’s marginal utility of market con-
sumption with expected marginal life-time utility of housing from next period on. The wedge
acts like an ad-valorem tax, making an additional unit of housing more or less expensive in
terms of current market consumption. Alternatively, it resembles a housing ‘taste shock’
(e.g., Liu et al., 2013), affecting the marginal rate of substitution between market consump-
tion and housing. If θ = 0 (i.e., no mortgage finance), the wedge is equal to zero and the
equilibrium is the same as in GKR; the same results if the finance constraint is specified
with inequality and is slack.
24We also adopt the convention of denoting by u2t, for example, the first derivative of the u function with
respect to its second argument.
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For future reference, note that V˜dt is obtained by the Benveniste-Scheinkman theorem as
(17)
V˜dt = −u1tc1t
(
Rt + δDt
1 + pit
)
+β
(
1− δDt
1 + pit
)
Et
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζxt(δ
α
Dt − κ)VδD,t+1 + ζxt(Rt − it)VR,t+1
]
,
where ζxt measures the marginal contribution of new loans to the stock of new debt, ζxt ≡
θqtxHt/
(
1−δDt
1+pit
d˜t + θqtxHt
)2
. The associated terms have analogous interpretation as in the
case of old unamortized debt in equation (14).
4.2 Nominal interest rates and the wedge
An insight into the interpretation of the wedge is gained by again considering a once-and-
for-all house purchase with no outstanding initial debt (i.e., d˜t = 0 and xH,t+j = 0, for
j = 1, 2, ...). In this case, ζDt = 0 in equation (16) and ζx,t+j = 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., in equation
(17), shifted one period forward. Further, the laws of motion (11)-(13) simplify as in the
example in Section 3.2.1. The wedge (16) becomes
(18) τHt = −θ
[
1 + βEt
(
V˜d,t+1
u1tc1t
)]
and equation (17), shifted one period forward, is
(19) V˜dt+1 = −u1,t+1c1,t+1
(
it + δD,t+1
1 + pit+1
)
+ β
(
1− δD,t+1
1 + pit+1
)
Et+1V˜d,t+2,
where it is either a FRM rate, an thus constant throughout the life of the loan, or an ARM
rate, and thus time-varying. By forward substitution of equation (19)
(20) τHt = −θ
{
1− Et
[
Qt+1
it + δD,t+1
1 + pit+1
+Qt+1Qt+2
(it+1 + δD,t+2)(1− δt+1)
(1 + pit+1)(1 + pit+2)
+ ...
]}
,
where Qt+j ≡ β(u1,t+jc1,t+j)/(u1,t+j−1c1,t+j−1) is the stochastic discount factor of the rep-
resentative household. The expression inside the square brackets states the present value
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of new mortgage debt, given as the expected discounted sum of marginal per-period real
mortgage installments, weighted by the marginal utility of market consumption, over the
life-time of the loan. The wedge is thus equal to −θ times the difference between the ‘out-of-
pocket’ cost of financing an additional unit of housing, which is one unit of foregone market
consumption today, and the mortgage cost of doing so, which is the present value of expected
foregone market consumption in the future. A decline in the cost of mortgage finance (i.e.,
a decline of the expression in the square brackets) leads to a decline in the wedge. Through
equation (15), this then, ceteris paribus, increases xHt.
Continuing the exposition with the simplified wedge, it is apparent from equation (20)
that the behavior of the wedge depends on the exogenous stochastic process for the mortgage
and inflation rates, guiding the expectations of these variables through out the life of the loan,
and the endogenous behavior of consumption. A ceteris paribus decline in the mortgage rate
reduces the wedge. In the case of FRM, the decline applies to interest payments in all periods
of the loan’s life; in the case of ARM, the expected persistence of the decline matters: a more
persistent decline in it reduces the wedge by more. In contrast, a ceteris paribus decline in
expected inflation increases the wedge; a more persistent decline increases the wedge by more.
Recall that, over the business cycle, the inflation rate has similar cyclical dynamics as the
nominal interest rate (Table 3): inflation declines when nominal interest rates decline and
inflation increases when nominal interest rates increase. Which of the two variables is going
to affect the wedge more? Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that both rates decline by
one percentage point. Because δDt < 1 and at the front end of the loan’s life very small—for
instance, κ, the initial amortization rate, is 0.00162 for a 30-year mortgage—the real value
of mortgage installments at the front end declines. This is because an equal decline in it and
pit+1 reduces the numerator in the first expression on the right-hand side of equation (20) by
more than the denominator. The effect of lower inflation gains strength only in later periods
of the loan’s life (if the decline in inflation is persistent) as its cumulative effect starts to
sufficiently increase the real value of future installments. If the ‘front-end effect’ dominates
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this ‘back-end effect’, for instance due to discounting, the wedge declines.
One may wonder if a mortgage set in real, instead of nominal, terms would work equally
well. By setting in equation (20) pit = 0 for all t and letting it be the real interest rate, one
obtains a wedge for a real mortgage. Thus, if the real interest rate leads output negatively,
the wedge would decline prior to an increase in output. The issue with real interest rates,
however, is that they are not directly observable and have to be constructed as a difference
between nominal interest rates and estimates of inflation expectations.25 This has conse-
quences for the cyclical dynamics of real rates and Hornstein and Uhlig (2000) demonstrate
that their lead-lag pattern in relation to output is inconclusive. Real rates can lead nega-
tively or positively, depending on the way inflation expectations are estimated. In this sense
things are easier with nominal mortgages. With sufficient discounting, as explained above,
the first-order effect on the wedge comes from the nominal interest rate. The computational
experiments below indeed confirm that the wedge inherits the lead-lag dynamics of nominal
mortgage rates. A nominal long-term mortgage thus transmits nominal interest rates into
real mortgage costs.
Notice that if the mortgage was modeled as a one-period loan (i.e., δD,t+1 = 1), equation
(20) would reduce to
τHt = −θ
[
1− Et
(
µt+1
1 + it
1 + pit+1
)]
and a one-for-one decline in the nominal and inflation rates would cancel each other out,
leaving the wedge unaffected; holding inflation constant, a decline in it reduces the wedge
even in this case, but less than in the case of the mortgage where the decline, if persistent, af-
fects mortgage installments over many periods. In this sense, a long-term mortgage provides,
ceteris paribus, a stronger propagation mechanism for persistent shocks than a one-period
loan.
25Time series for yields on inflation protected government bonds are too short for business cycle analysis.
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5 Computational experiments
This section calibrates the model and reports findings from the main experiments. As the
lead-lag patterns of mortgage and inflation rates are roughly similar across countries, the
computational experiments are for a generic parameterization based on U.S. data.
5.1 Calibration
The parameter values are summarized in Table 4. One period in the model corresponds to
one quarter and the functional forms are as in GKR: u(., .) = ω log c+(1−ω) log(1−hM−hH);
c(., .) = cψMc
1−ψ
H ; G(., .) = k
η
Hh
1−η
H ; and F (., .) = k
%
Mh
1−%
M . The parameter AH is normalized
to be equal to one and the value of AMt in a nonstochastic steady state is chosen so that yt
in the nonstochastic steady state is equal to one.
As mentioned above, we abstract from consumer durable goods. In addition, housing ser-
vices are modeled explicitly in the home sector. The data equivalent to yt is thus GDP less
expenditures on consumer durable goods and the gross value added of housing. Nonresiden-
tial capital in the model is mapped into the sum of nonresidential structures and equipment
& software. If only nonresidential structures were used, the share of capital income in output,
%, would be too low, making the model dynamics difficult to compare with the literature.
As in GKR, J is set equal to 4 and φj is set equal to 0.25 for all j. The parameter % is
set equal to 0.283, based on measurement from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) obtained by Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert (2011). Their NIPA-based estimate of
τw = 0.243 is also used. The depreciation rates are given as the average ratios of investment
to the corresponding capital stocks. This yields δH = 0.0115 and δM = 0.0248. These are a
little higher than the average depreciation rates from BEA Fixed Assets Accounts because
the model abstracts from long-run population and TFP growth.
The parameter θ is set equal to 0.76, the average loan-to-value ratio for conventional single
family newly-built home mortgages (Federal Housing Finance Agency, Monthly Interest Rate
Survey, Table 10, 1963-2006). The steady-state mortgage rate i is set equal to 9.28 percent
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per annum, the average interest rate for the conventional 30-year FRM, 1971-2007, the
dominant mortgage contract in the U.S. The initial amortization rate κ equals 0.00162 while
α, the parameter governing the evolution of the amortization rate, is set equal to 0.9946.
These choices are guided by an approximation of installments of a 30-year mortgage (see
Appendix B). The steady-state inflation rate is set equal to 4.54 percent per annum, the
average inflation rate for 1971-2007, which is the same period as that used to parameterize
i. Given these values, the law of motion (12) implies a (quarterly) steady-state amortization
rate of 0.0144, which—as in the data—is higher than the depreciation rate of residential
structures. These values imply that in steady state the difference between the receipts of
mortgage payments on outstanding debt and new loans is equal to 2.1 percent of output.
The discount factor β, the share of consumption in utility ω, the share of market good in
consumption ψ, the share of capital in home production η, and the tax rate on income from
nonresidential capital τr are calibrated jointly. Namely, by matching the average values of
hM , hH , kM/y, kH/y, and the after-tax real rate of return on nonresidential capital, using the
steady-state versions of the first-order conditions for hM , hH , sJ , and xH (see Appendix B),
and the model’s after-tax real rate of return on nonresidential capital, (1− τr)(AMF1− δM),
evaluated in steady state. According to the American Time-Use Survey (2003), individuals
aged 16+ spent on average 25.5 percent of their available time working in the market and 24
percent in home production. We assume that half of home hours correspond to our notion
of hH . The average capital-to-output ratios are 4.88 for nonresidential capital and 4.79 for
residential capital (in both cases expenditures on consumer durable goods and gross value
added of housing are subtracted from GDP). The average (annual) after-tax real rate of
return on nonresidential capital is measured by Gomme et al. (2011) to be 5.16 percent.
These five targets yield β = 0.988, ω = 0.47, ψ = 0.69, η = 0.30, and τr = 0.61. As is
common in models with disaggregated capital, the tax rate on market capital is higher than
the statutory tax rate or an implicit tax rate calculated from NIPA. The calibration implies
that in steady state the wedge τH is small, equal to -1.17 percent.
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The parameterization of the exogenous stochastic process is based on point estimates
of a VAR(3) process for TFP, the mortgage rate for a 30-year conventional FRM, and the
inflation rate (see Appendix C for details). By construction, this process generates dynamic
correlations of the mortgage and inflation rates with output similar to those in Table 3.
The parameter σ, which controls the curvature of the PPF, is chosen by matching the
ratio of the standard deviations (for HP-filtered data) of residential investment (single family
structures) and GDP. This yields σ = 6.4. The percentage deviation of qt from its steady-
state value q = 1 is related to the percentage deviation of xHt from its steady-state value
xH = 0.055 as q̂t = (xHσ)x̂Ht. If we interpret qt as the relative price of newly constructed
homes, its volatility in the model is comparable to that in the data. In both cases the
standard deviation, for HP-filtered logged data, is about 3 (the data counterpart used is the
average sales prices of new homes sold, 1975-2007, from the Department of Commerce). In
addition, in both the model and the data, the contemporaneous correlation with output is
around 0.5. However, due to the absence of housing supply shocks, the model overstates the
correlation between qt and xHt.
5.2 Findings for one-period residential time to build
Table 5 reports the cyclical behavior of the model economy. Specifically, it contains the
standard deviations (relative to that of yt) of the key endogenous variables and their cross-
correlations with yt at various leads and lags. The upper panel shows the results for the
baseline case of one-period residential time to build. The first thing to notice is that, de-
spite the introduction of mortgages, the basic variables, yt, hMt, cMt, and xt behave like in
other business cycle models and the behavior of total investment is broadly in line with the
international evidence on GFCF in Figure 1.
Second, residential investment leads output. It is also more volatile than nonresidential
investment. In addition, although not strictly lagging, nonresidential investment is substan-
tially more positively correlated with past output than future output. The reason behind
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the lead in residential investment can be understood from the cyclical behavior of the wedge,
which leads negatively. Referring back to our discussion in Section 4.2 and Table 3, notice
that the lead-lag pattern of the wedge is similar to that of the mortgage rates.26
5.3 Multi-period residential time to build
When residential construction takes more than one period, a distinction needs to be made
between finished houses and ongoing residential projects. With some small modifications,
residential time to build is modeled in the same way as nonresidential time to build. The
household makes an out-of-pocket investment in residential projects and, upon completion,
sells the finished homes at a price q∗t . The household also buys finished homes for its own
use (think of the household as a homebuilder who likes houses of other makes than its
own). Let n∗t denote the number of newly constructed homes, occupiable next period, that
the household wants to purchase for its own use and let n1t denote the number of homes,
occupiable next period, built by the household. With these modifications, the household’s
budget constraint becomes
cMt+xMt+qtxHt+q
∗
t n
∗
t = (1−τr)rtkMt+τrδMkMt+(1−τw)wthMt+q∗t n1t+ lt/pt−mt/pt+τt,
where lt = θptq
∗
t n
∗
t and xHt =
∑N
ι=1 µιnιt, with nιt denoting residential projects ι periods
from completion (
∑N
ι=1 µι = 1). The stock of houses for the household’s own use evolves as
kH,t+1 = (1− δH)kHt + n∗t
and the on-going residential projects evolve as
nι−1,t+1 = nιt, for ι = 2, ..., N.
26As new mortgage lending in the model (in real terms) is a constant fraction θ of residential investment,
it leads output exactly as residential investment. This is consistent with the empirical findings in Table 2.
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In equilibrium, n∗t = n1t. The economy’s resource constraint is the same as before, cMt +
xMt + qtxHt = yt, except that
xHt =
N∑
ι=1
µιnιt,
with n1t, ..., nN−1,t being a part of the vector of state variables. Section 2.3 suggests that
residential time to build in the countries in the sample other than the U.S. and Canada may
be as long as one year. N is therefore set equal to 4. In the absence of information on the
distribution of value put in place over the construction period, the µ’s are assumed to be the
same as the φ’s in nonresidential time to build, µι = 0.25 ∀ι. This parameterization has the
additional advantage of treating the two types of time to build symmetrically. Shifting the
weights towards the first period makes residential investment behave more like starts while
shifting the weights towards the last period makes residential investment behave more like
completions. The findings in Table 1 suggest that evenly distributed µ’s are plausible.
The results are reported in the lower panel of Table 5. In addition to the variables reported
in the case of one-period time to build, the table also reports results for ‘housing starts’ n4t
(i.e., structures four periods from completion) and ‘completions’ n0t (i.e., structures that in
period t have become a part of the usable housing stock ht). As the table shows, xHt now
reaches the highest correlation at j = 0, while starts lead by two quarters and completions lag
by two quarters. The lead in housing starts occurs despite the fact that housing construction
is financed by out-of-pocket expenses. The cyclical properties of the basic aggregates yt, hMt,
cMt and xt are left, more or less, unaffected.
6 The quantitative importance of mortgages
In order to further investigate the quantitative role of mortgages, Table 6 reports the dy-
namic properties of the investment variables and the wedge for various specifications of the
model (with one-period residential time to build). Recall that the model contains two forces
pulling in opposite directions: the standard consumption smoothing effect, pushing residen-
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tial investment to lag, and the wedge, inducing residential investment to lead. As σ is a
free parameter, in each experiment it is recalibrated so as to match the relative volatility
of residential investment, like in the baseline experiment. For easy comparison, panel (a)
repeats the results for the baseline experiment.
We start, in panel (b), by removing mortgages (θ = 0). The exogenous VAR process,
however, stays the same. This guarantees that the underlying probability space of the
economy remains unchanged.27 When θ = 0, the mortgage and inflation rates matter only
to the extent that they help forecast future TFP. Specifically, referring back to the dynamics
of these variables in Table 3, a low mortgage or inflation rate forecasts high TFP. Thus the
two nominal variables work as ‘news shocks’, signalling higher output and income in the
future. As we see in panel (b), with θ = 0, the lead-lag patterns observed in the baseline
case disappear: both xHt and xMt are now coincident with output, with xHt being more
strongly correlated with output at lags and xMt being more strongly correlated with output
at leads. As GKR show, this inverted lead-lag pattern would be even more pronounced if
there was no time to build in nonresidential capital.
Notice that even though the behavior of its components changes, the behavior of total
investment, xt, remains broadly unaffected by removing mortgage finance. In fact, the
dynamics of xt stay, more or less, unchanged across all model specifications in the table. This
is because consumption smoothing constrains the response of total investment to shocks.
A corollary of this result is that xMt has to lag output when xHt leads with sufficiently
high volatility and vice versa.28 The results of the current experiment also mean that, by
themselves, expectations of higher future TFP (positive ‘news shocks’) are insufficient to
produce residential investment leading output.
As noted in Section 2.5, typical loan-to-value ratios for new mortgage loans are similar
across the countries in the sample. However, Belgium and France have only about half as high
mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios than Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., with Canada being
27The VAR is kept the same across experiments (a)-(d).
28Arguably, this consumption smoothing constraint would be weaker if the model economy was an open
economy.
32
somewhere in-between (International Monetary Fund, 2011). This partly reflects historically
smaller fraction of new homes financed through mortgages in these countries. Setting θ equal
to 0.36 yields steady-state debt-to-output ratio about half as high as in the baseline. Panel
(c) shows that in this case xHt still exhibits a lead, though less pronounced than in the
baseline. This is because with a lower θ the wedge responds less to shocks than in the
baseline.
Panel (d) considers the case of a one-period loan (δDt = 1 ∀t), which results when α = 0
and κ = 1. In line with our discussion in Section 4.2, the wedge is now little volatile and
essentially uncorrelated with output, resulting in an absence of any lead in xHt.
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Panel (e) investigates the role of the interest and inflation rate dynamics. Specifically, it
considers the extreme case in which it and pit are held constant at their steady-state values.
The estimated VAR process is replaced with an AR(1) process for TFP, with persistence 0.94
(the highest eigenvalue of the original process) and the standard deviation of the innovation
equal to 0.008. The household understands that it and pit are now constant. We consider
this to be a ‘policy’ experiment and therefore, unlike in the other cases, do not recalibrate σ.
Under this specification, the lead in xHt again disappears. A corollary of this result is that
the time series properties of residential investment observed in the data are likely to change
when the dynamics of the two nominal variables (and especially of the nominal interest rate)
change.
Finally, FRM is compared with ARM. Under ARM, the mortgage rate in the model is
reset every period (a quarter). A natural choice for an ARM rate is therefore the yield on
3-month T-bills (the VAR process is re-estimated using this interest rate and is reported
in Appendix C). Panel (f) shows that in this case a positive correlation of xHt with output
occurs only at leads of two or more quarters. The highest positive correlation (0.39) occurs
at j = −5, which falls outside of the table, and the contemporaneous correlation is negative.
This long lead and the negative contemporaneous correlation are due to the wedge starting to
29The same result is obtained if the VAR process in this experiment includes a 3-month T-Bill rate, instead
of the FRM interest rate.
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increase well ahead of a peak in output; compare the behavior of the wedge with its behavior
in the baseline case. The early rise in the wedge reflects the anticipated future increases in
the short-term nominal interest rate, occurring alongside increases in output (refer back to
Table 3).30
Bucks and Pence (2008) compare survey evidence on the perceived adjustability of ARM
rates by households to administrative data on ARM terms and show that households system-
atically underestimate the extent to which their ARM rates can rise as short-term interest
rates increase. To the extent that this is the case, the model—in which households under-
stand the stochastic process for the short rate—overstates, relative to the actual economy,
the responses to expected future rises in interest rates. Panel (g) carries out the same exer-
cise as panel (f), but using the initial interest rate charged on ARMs, instead of the 3-month
T-bill rate. This is the interest rate that most ARMs carry for a specified initial period
before interest payments become tied to an index, such as a T-bill rate. In the data, the
initial ARM rate tends to stay low for longer than the 3-month T-bill rate and increases less
sharply over the business cycle. Panel (g) of Table 6 shows that in this case xHt leads by
two quarters, instead of five, with a positive contemporaneous correlation.
Notice that in cases (b)-(g), σ needs to be smaller than in the baseline in order to achieve
the observed volatility of xHt. As a result, house prices in these cases are less volatile than
in the baseline.
7 Concluding remarks
In a sample of developed economies, residential construction, measured by housing starts,
leads real GDP. When measured by residential investment in national accounts, the lead is
observed in the U.S. and Canada; in other countries in the sample, residential investment is
more or less coincident with GDP. Such cyclical properties are at odds with the predictions of
30Koijen et al. (2009) argue that the changes in the relative cost of FRM v.s. ARM are mainly driven
by cyclical variations in term premia. Such variations are here implicitly reflected in the VAR processes for
FRM and ARM.
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existing business cycle models that disaggregate capital into residential and nonresidential.
Motivated by a striking similarity, across countries, of the cyclical properties of nominal
mortgage interest rates, and the dependence of house purchases on mortgage finance, we
introduce mortgages into an otherwise standard business cycle model with home and market
sectors. The mortgage in the model resembles first-lien loans used for house purchases only.
Feeding into the model the observed cyclical dynamics of nominal mortgage interest rates
and inflation rates produces a lead-lag pattern of residential and nonresidential investment
similar to those in the U.S. and Canada. Increasing time to build in residential construction
then makes residential investment coincident with GDP as in most other countries in the
sample. Housing starts, however, still lead output as in the data. The results come at no cost
in terms of deteriorating the model’s ability to account for standard business cycle moments
as much as other models in the literature.
Due to the absence of an off-the-shelf theory for the cyclical lead-lag pattern of mortgage
rates, and nominal interest rates more generally, the stochastic process for mortgage rates is
taken as exogenous. However, by itself, the process is not sufficient to reproduce the lead in
housing starts and residential investment observed in the data. The other necessary element
is the long-term and nominal nature of mortgage loans, which allows the transmission of
nominal interest rates into real housing costs. The model also predicts that the cyclical lead
in residential construction is not structural in nature: once the cyclical dynamics of nominal
interest rates and inflation change, the empirical regularities of residential investment change
as well.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer the question what drives the observed
movements of mortgage rates. We have documented that their cyclical behavior is similar to
that of government nominal bond yields of comparable maturities but leave open for future
research the issue of the lead-lag pattern and causality between government bond yields and
output.
While the main aim of the paper was to enhance our understanding of the lead-lag dy-
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namics of residential investment, a broader lesson of the analysis is that nominal interest
rates, in conjunction with long-term nominal mortgage loans, may have quantitatively sig-
nificant effects on the economy. In our framework this shows up only in the composition of
total investment, not in other aggregate variables. It is, however, worth investigating chan-
nels through which such effects could transmit into the broader economy. This, of course,
requires a richer framework than the one used here. Extensions of existing models used for
monetary policy analysis along the lines explored here may provide insights into the trans-
mission of monetary policy above and beyond the standard channels. This is where explicit
modeling of long-term nominal loans is likely to be most fruitful.
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Figure 1: Cyclical dynamics of total fixed investment (gross fixed capital formation).
The plots are correlations of real investment in t + j with real GDP in t; the data
are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter. The volatility of total fixed
investment (measured by its standard deviation relative to that of real GDP) is:
AUS = 3.98, BEL = 3.93, CAN = 3.32, FRA = 2.65, UK = 2.55, US = 3.23.
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Figure 2: Cyclical dynamics of residential and nonresidential investment. The plots
are correlations of real investment in t + j with real GDP in t; the data are logged
and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter. The volatility of residential (nonresidential)
investment, relative to that of real GDP, is: AUS = 5.95 (6.96), BEL = 7.97 (4.36),
CAN = 4.39 (3.97), FRA = 3.05 (3.24), UK = 5.02 (3.24), US = 6.42 (3.40).
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Figure 3: Statistical significance of leads and lags in investment dynamics. His-
tograms show the frequency with which a given j has the highest correlation coeffi-
cient in a sample of 10,000 cross-correlograms based on bootstrapped data.
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Figure 4: Housing starts. The top six charts plot cross-correlations in historical data
(logged and HP-filtered); the bottom six charts show the statistical significance
of leads and lags in the data; i.e., the frequency with which a given j has the
highest correlation coefficient in a sample of 10,000 cross-correlograms based on
bootstrapped data. The volatility of housing starts in the historical data, relative
to that of real GDP, is: AUS = 8.80, BEL = 11.67, CAN = 9.95, FRA = 6.24, UK
= 9.81, US = 9.72.
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Table 1: Starts, completions, and residential investmenta
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
United States
Starts
1 unit 8.85 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.56 0.33 0.05 -0.18 -0.35 -0.42
5+ units 14.54 0.40 0.50 0.55 0.53 0.43 0.27 0.09 -0.06 -0.17
Completions
1 unit 7.17 0.64 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.53 0.29 0.07 -0.12
5+ units 10.56 0.09 0.19 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.64 0.57 0.48
Resid. invest.
Single-family 8.77 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.60 0.35 0.08 -0.17 -0.33
Multifamily 11.22 0.16 0.28 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.32 0.19 0.07
Australia
Starts 8.80 0.31 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.36 0.16 -0.08 -0.27 -0.40
Completions 6.87 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.42 0.50 0.47 0.33 0.14 -0.05
Resid. invest. 5.95 0.11 0.26 0.41 0.55 0.57 0.48 0.29 0.11 -0.08
United Kingdom
Starts 9.81 0.61 0.68 0.69 0.61 0.42 0.16 -0.11 -0.35 -0.53
Completions 4.62 -0.07 0.10 0.29 0.46 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.49 0.37
Resid. invest. 5.02 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.32 0.20 0.05
a The series are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter.
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
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Table 2: U.S. data—further detailsa
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
The effect of Regulation Q
Resid. invest.
1959.Q1–1983.Q4 8.84 0.58 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.62 0.39 0.14 -0.11 -0.30
1984.Q1–2006.Q4 8.40 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.48 0.28 0.05 -0.13 -0.25
Mortgage lending and resid. investmentc
Home mortgagesd 15.01 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.42 0.23 0.10 -0.08 -0.19
Resid. invest. 8.77 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.60 0.35 0.08 -0.17 -0.33
Monetary policy regimes
3-m nom. int. rate
1959.Q1–1979.Q3 0.56 -0.59 -0.39 -0.17 0.07 0.32 0.52 0.61 0.63 0.62
1979.Q4–2006.Q4 0.96 -0.40 -0.21 -0.03 0.25 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.43
10-yr nom. int. rate
1959.Q1–1979.Q3 0.28 -0.60 -0.51 -0.43 -0.30 -0.17 -0.02 0.11 0.25 0.39
1979.Q4–2006.Q4 0.60 -0.44 -0.33 -0.16 -0.02 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.07
Inflation rate (CPI)
1959.Q1–1979.Q3 1.00 -0.53 -0.39 -0.16 0.03 0.25 0.46 0.56 0.67 0.68
1979.Q4–2006.Q4 1.32 -0.10 -0.02 0.23 0.31 0.44 0.45 0.28 0.23 0.20
a The series are logged and filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter.
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
c Both for 1959.Q1–2006.Q4
d Net change in home mortgages, deflated with GDP deflator (home mortgages = 1-4 family properties).
The fraction of new construction accounted for by 2-4 family structures is small making home mortgages a
good proxy for single-family housing mortgages, for which data are not available.
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Table 3: Cyclical dynamics of nominal mortgage interest ratesa
Relative Correlations of real GDP in t with a variable in t+ j:
std. dev.b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Mortgage ratesc
AUS ARM 0.59 -0.29 -0.22 -0.16 -0.03 0.12 0.25 0.39 0.48 0.50
BEL FRM 10 yrs 0.89 -0.17 0.01 0.19 0.38 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.41
CAN FRM 5 yrs 0.77 -0.52 -0.41 -0.24 -0.04 0.19 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.43
FRA FRM 15 yrs 0.87 -0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.36 0.35 0.31 0.27
UK ARMd 1.29 -0.68 -0.52 -0.31 -0.06 0.17 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.56
US FRM 30 yrs 0.55 -0.59 -0.55 -0.46 -0.29 -0.07 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.23
Government bond yieldse
AUS 3-m 1.07 -0.19 -0.06 0.10 0.24 0.34 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.34
BEL 10-yr 0.75 -0.01 0.20 0.33 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.31 0.19
CAN 3-5-yr 0.73 -0.42 -0.25 -0.06 0.17 0.39 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.41
FRA 10-yr 0.86 -0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.24
UK 3-m 1.29 -0.68 -0.52 -0.31 -0.06 0.17 0.36 0.49 0.55 0.56
US 10-yr 0.53 -0.45 -0.39 -0.29 -0.11 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.09
3-m 0.88 -0.45 -0.30 -0.10 0.17 0.39 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.46
Inflation ratesf
AUS 1.60 -0.31 -0.19 0.01 0.24 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.42
BEL 0.76 -0.03 -0.13 -0.23 -0.25 -0.17 0.02 0.22 0.39 0.44
CAN 1.10 -0.29 -0.12 0.06 0.23 0.37 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.51
FRA 1.08 -0.34 -0.25 -0.15 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.11 0.24
UK 2.16 -0.68 -0.61 -0.45 -0.24 0.01 0.20 0.36 0.45 0.51
US 1.24 -0.27 -0.12 0.02 0.21 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.51
a GDP is in logs; all series are filtered with Hodrick-Prescott filter; time periods differ across countries
due to different availability of mortgage rate data: AUS (59.Q3-06.Q4), BEL (80.Q1-06.Q4), CAN
(61.Q1-06.Q4), FRA (78.Q1-06.Q4), UK (65.Q1-06.Q4), US (71.Q2-06.Q4).
b Standard deviations are expressed relative to that of a country’s real GDP.
c Based on a typical mortgage for each country, as reported by Calza et al. (2013) and
Scanlon and Whitehead (2004). Mortgages rates are APR. ARM = adjustable rate mortgage (in-
terest rate can be reset within one year), FRM = fixed rate mortgage (interest rate can be at the
earliest reset only after 5 years). The numbers accompanying FRMs refer to the number of years for
which the mortgage rate is typically fixed.
d U.K. mortgage rate data are available only from 1995.Q1. 3-m T-bill rate is used as a proxy for the
adjustable mortgage rate for the period 1965.Q1-1994.Q4; the correlation between the two interest
rates for the period 1995.Q1-2006.Q4 is 0.97.
e Constant maturity rates; APR; periods correspond to those of mortgage rates.
f Consumer price indexes; q-on-q percentage change at annual rate; periods correspond to those of
mortgage rates.
48
Table 4: Calibration
Symbol Value Definition
Preferences
β 0.988 Discount factor
ω 0.472 Consumption share in utility
ψ 0.692 Share of market good
in consumption
Home technology
δH 0.0115 Depreciation rate
η 0.305 Capital share in production
Nonresidential time to build
J 4 Number of periods
φj 0.25 Fraction completed at stage j
Market technology
δM 0.0248 Depreciation rate
% 0.283 Capital share in production
σ 6.4 PPF curvature parameter
Tax rates
τw 0.243 Tax rate on labor income
τr 0.612 Tax rate on capital income
Mortgages
θ 0.76 Loan-to-value ratio
κ 0.00162 Initial amortization rate
α 0.9946 Adjustment factor
i 0.0232 Steady-state mortgage rate
pi 0.0113 Steady-state inflation rate
Note: The parameters of the exogenous stochastic process are contained
in Appendix C of the supplemental material.
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Table 5: Cyclical behavior of the model economya
Rel. Correlations of y in period t with variable υ in period t+ j:
υt+j st. dev.
b j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
1-period residential time to build
Main aggregates
y 1.01 -0.03 0.19 0.48 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.48 0.19 -0.03
hM 0.56 0.10 0.31 0.57 0.76 0.89 0.68 0.41 0.07 -0.21
cM 0.48 -0.21 -0.09 0.13 0.38 0.70 0.52 0.38 0.29 0.28
x 4.42 0.07 0.29 0.56 0.78 0.93 0.71 0.43 0.10 -0.18
Investment components and the wedge
xH 8.45 0.19 0.34 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.31 0.11 -0.13 -0.32
xM 4.33 -0.12 0.03 0.25 0.50 0.78 0.70 0.52 0.31 0.12
τH 3.26 -0.21 -0.33 -0.43 -0.43 -0.32 -0.17 -0.02 0.18 0.34
4-period residential time to build
Main aggregates
y 1.01 -0.03 0.17 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.17 -0.03
hM 0.54 0.11 0.30 0.55 0.76 0.92 0.66 0.37 0.05 -0.21
cM 0.44 -0.23 -0.10 0.14 0.41 0.76 0.58 0.43 0.31 0.29
x 4.32 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.77 0.95 0.69 0.40 0.08 -0.17
Investment components, starts, completions, and the wedgec
xH 6.51 0.18 0.32 0.47 0.57 0.60 0.42 0.14 -0.16 -0.40
n4 8.89 0.33 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.38 -0.10 -0.33 -0.40 -0.34
n0 8.88 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.18 0.33 0.40 0.50 0.48 0.38
xM 4.11 -0.13 0.05 0.31 0.60 0.90 0.80 0.62 0.38 0.14
τH 3.17 -0.22 -0.34 -0.43 -0.42 -0.29 -0.16 -0.02 0.18 0.34
a Calibration is as in Table 4. The statistics are averages for 200 artificial data samples.
All variables are in percentage deviations from steady state, except the wedge, which
is in percentage point deviations from steady state. Before computing the statistics for
each sample, the artificial data were filtered with the HP filter.
b Standard deviations are measured relative to that of y; the standard deviation of y is
in absolute terms.
c n4 = housing starts (houses that in period t are four periods from completion), n0 =
housing completions (houses that in period t− 1 were one period away from completion
and in period t are a part of the housing stock).
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Table 6: Impact of mortgage finance on investment dynamics
Rel. Correlations of y in period t with variable υ in period t+ j:
υt+j st. dev. j = -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
(a) Baseline; σ = 6.4
x 4.42 0.07 0.29 0.56 0.78 0.93 0.71 0.43 0.10 -0.18
xH 8.45 0.19 0.34 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.31 0.11 -0.13 -0.32
xM 4.33 -0.12 0.03 0.25 0.50 0.78 0.70 0.52 0.31 0.12
τH 3.26 -0.21 -0.33 -0.43 -0.43 -0.32 -0.17 -0.02 0.18 0.34
(b) No mortgage finance; it and pit are only news shocks; σ = 0.03
x 4.71 0.15 0.27 0.49 0.72 0.99 0.68 0.41 0.17 0.04
xH 8.45 -0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.33 0.67 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.56
xM 5.06 0.24 0.37 0.57 0.73 0.83 0.51 0.19 -0.11 -0.37
τH – – – – – – – – – –
(c) Low mortgage finance (θ = 0.36); σ = 2.87
x 4.50 0.05 0.27 0.54 0.77 0.96 0.72 0.44 0.11 -0.16
xH 8.45 0.16 0.32 0.50 0.60 0.59 0.37 0.15 -0.11 -0.30
xM 4.36 -0.08 0.07 0.30 0.56 0.84 0.71 0.51 0.28 0.08
τH 1.53 -0.19 -0.31 -0.41 -0.42 -0.31 -0.18 -0.03 0.18 0.35
(d) 1-period loan (δDt = 1 ∀t); σ = 0.41
x 4.97 0.11 0.19 0.49 0.63 0.95 0.63 0.42 0.15 -0.02
xH 8.45 0.08 -0.03 0.28 0.24 0.63 0.39 0.29 0.22 0.16
xM 4.78 0.10 0.32 0.51 0.76 0.93 0.64 0.40 0.05 -0.16
τH 0.41 -0.12 0.14 -0.15 0.12 -0.18 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01
(e) Constant it and pit (held at steady-state values); σ = 6.4
x 3.49 0.16 0.30 0.49 0.71 0.98 0.69 0.44 0.20 -0.02
xH 0.72 0.09 0.24 0.44 0.68 0.99 0.69 0.45 0.28 0.17
xM 4.65 0.16 0.31 0.49 0.71 0.97 0.69 0.43 0.19 -0.04
τH 0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.24 0.47 0.79 0.49 0.33 0.31 0.45
(f) ARM (3m T-Bill rate); σ = 1.97
x 4.02 0.11 0.15 0.39 0.66 0.94 0.68 0.35 0.05 -0.05
xH 8.45 0.37 0.33 0.17 -0.05 -0.31 -0.45 -0.54 -0.56 -0.52
xM 8.26 -0.11 -0.05 0.20 0.49 0.82 0.71 0.52 0.32 0.23
τH 1.22 -0.25 -0.22 0.02 0.29 0.64 0.61 0.60 0.55 0.56
(g) ARM (ARM rate); σ = 0.96
x 4.20 0.17 0.36 0.59 0.79 0.96 0.75 0.50 0.21 -0.04
xH 8.45 0.33 0.42 0.45 0.38 0.24 0.03 -0.17 -0.29 -0.36
xM 5.85 -0.05 0.09 0.30 0.56 0.83 0.77 0.64 0.42 0.21
τH 0.78 -0.27 -0.26 -0.15 0.06 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.42
Notes: Except case (e), σ is recalibrated so as to keep std(xHt)/ std(yt) constant
across experiments. Cases (a)-(d): the underlying probability space (i.e., the VAR
process) is kept constant. Case (e): the process is changed to an AR(1) for TFP,
with a persistence parameter 0.94 and the standard deviation of the innovation
0.008. Cases (f) and (g): a VAR process with the short-term interest rate noted in
the brackets, instead of the FRM rate.
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